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BARTLETr V. STRICKLAND: THE CROSSOVER OF RACE AND
POLITICS
INTRODUCTION

Since the passage of Voting Rights Act of 1965,1 the United States
Supreme Court has addressed a variety of forms of racial discrimination
in voter redistricting plans.2 For cases brought under § 2 of the Act, the
Court has developed specific standards to evaluate claims of vote dilution and political gerrymandering. In Bartlett v. Strickland,3 the Court
restricted dilution claims to instances where the racial minority would
constitute more than fifty percent of the voting age population in the proposed district. 4 In doing so, the Court correctly upheld the rights created
under the Voting Rights Act, maintained a workable solution for resolving § 2 claims, and reduced the role of race in election districting and
American politics.
Part I of this Comment reviews the history of vote dilution and race,
and pertinent case law. Part II summarizes the Court's decision in Bartlett v. Strickland, including the facts, procedural history, and opinions.
Part ll analyzes Bartlett and presents the negative consequences of expanding § 2 to crossover districts. The Comment concludes by arguing
that the Court's holding in Bartlett properly reflects the shrinking role of
race in American electoral politics.
I. BACKGROUND

A. Vote Dilution and § 2 of the Voting Rights Act
Although the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution granted African-Americans the right to vote shortly after the Civil
War,5 Southern states instituted an array of measures to disenfranchise
African-Americans and minimize their presence in the electoral process.6
These tactics included literacy tests, poll taxes, and gerrymandering.7
1.
2.
tion, 117
3.
4.

5.

42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2006).
See Note, The Implicationsof Coalitionaland Influence Districtsfor Vote DilutionLitigaHARV. L. REv. 2598, 2599 (2004).
129 S.Ct. 1231 (2009).
Id. at 1249.

U.S. CONST. amends. XIV-XV.

6.
GARRINE P. LANEY, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND
CURRENT ISSUES 3-6 (2003). For additional information on African-American disenfranchisement

and the history of minority voting rights, see generally PATRICIA GURIN ET AL., HOPE AND
INDEPENDENCE: BLACKS' RESPONSE TO ELECTORAL AND PARTY POLITICS (1989); ALEXANDER
KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES
(2000); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE
UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION (1999).

7.

See LANEY, supra note 6, at 3-5.
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Beginning in 1890, eight states enacted literacy tests specifically designed to prevent African-Americans from voting, based on the fact that
more than two-thirds of the African-American population was illiterate.8
Many states instituted poll taxes intended to prevent minorities from voting. 9 In Florida, African-Americans who were able to pay the poll tax
often encountered technical problems, such as inaccurate voting certificates and address information, which disqualified them from voting. 10
Additionally, in 1882, South Carolina created one district out of seven
with a majority of African-American voters, even though AfricanAmericans outnumbered registered white voters by over 30,000 in all
districts.11 That district-pejoratively described as a "boa constrictor"ran over
150 miles, split six counties, and extended into the Atlantic
12
Ocean.
To fight these thinly veiled attempts to disenfranchise minority voters, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act in 1965.13 The Act addressed
racial disenfranchisement in three ways. 14 First, it prohibited the use of
literacy tests and other qualifications used to prevent minorities from
voting. 15 Second, § 5 of the Act required certain Southern states to seek
preapproval for any redistricting schemes from the Department of Justice. 16 Third, § 2 authorized minority voters to sue in federal courts for
violation of their voting rights. 17
In addition to the Voting Rights Act requirements, the Supreme
Court held in 1964 that state legislative districts must have roughly equal
voting populations throughout a state.' 8 States have enacted similar standards to the Court's holding and require that their legislative districts
have a roughly equal number of voters.1 9 While the original Voting
8.
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310-11 (1966).
9. J. Morgan Kousser, The Undermining of the First Reconstruction:Lessons for the Second,
in MINORrrY VOTE DILUTION 27, 30-31 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984).
10.
PAUL LEWINSON, RACE, CLASS, AND PARTY: A HISTORY OF NEGRO SUFFRAGE AND
WHITE POLITICS IN THE SOUTH 119 (1963).

11.
Donald Norton Brown, Southern Attitudes Toward Negro Voting in the Bourbon Period,
1877-1890, at 150-151 (1960) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma) (on file
with Bizzell Library, University of Oklahoma).
12.
Laughlin McDonald, The Looming 2010 Census: A Proposed Judicially Manageable
Standardand Other Reform Optionsfor PartisanGerrymandering,46 HARv. J. ON LEGIS, 243, 246
(2009) (citing Brown, supra note 11, at 150).
13.
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
14.. Id. §§ 1973b-1973c.
15.
Id. § 1973b.
16.
Id. § 1973c.
17.
Id. § 1973b.
18.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568-69 (1964).
19.

See NAT'L CONFERENCE ON STATE LEGISLATURES, REDISTRICTING LAW 2010, at 127

(2009) (surveying redistricting criteria for all fifty states). In California, for example, seven general
criteria provide the basis for any redistricting plan:
(1) The districts in each plan should be equal in population, with strict equality in the
case of congressional districts and reasonable equality in the case of legislative districts.
(2) The territory included within a district should be contiguous and compact. (3) Insofar
as practical counties and cities should be maintained intact. (4) Insofar as possible the in-
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Rights Act and state regulations on redistricting addressed overt attempts
to disenfranchise minority voters, Southern states have employed more
subtle means of keeping voting rights in white hands. Vote dilution is
one such tactic.
Vote dilution occurs when an electoral districting body unlawfully
weakens a minority group's ability to elect a chosen candidate by creating a large, majority-dominated district.20 To remedy vote dilution, legislatures may create "majority-minority" districts, where the protected
minority group constitutes a numerical majority of the population within
the new district. 21 Initially, the Fifteenth Amendment served as the primary avenue for dilution claims. 22 In response to public outcry following

two Supreme Court holdings that required intentional discrimination to
prove a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment in voting dilution cases,23
Congress amended § 2 in 1982 to remove any intent requirements. 24 In
the amended version, a voting practice or procedure denies or abridges a
group's right to vote if:
[Biased on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a
class of citizens protected ... in that its members have less opportu-

nity than other members of the electorate to participate
25 in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.
The Senate also attached a report recommending that courts, in
place of a need for intent, use a "totality of the circumstances" test included in the Act. 26 The "totality of the circumstances" test and the juditegnity of the state's basic geographical regions should be preserved. (5) The community
of interests of the population of an area should be considered in determining whether the
area should be included within or excluded from a proposed district so that all of the citizens of the district may be represented reasonably, fairly and effectively. (6) State senatorial districts should be formed by combining adjacent assembly districts, and, to the degree practicable, assembly district boundaries should be used as congressional district
boundaries. (7) The basis for reapportionment should be the.., census, and in counties
where census tracts exist, such tracts should be used as the basic unit for district formation.
Legislature of Cal. v. Reinecke, 516 P.2d 6, 10 (Cal. 1973).
20. Adam B. Cox & Tomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of Voting
Rights Jurisprudence,75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1493, 1498 (2008).
21.
Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES IN
MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 7,49 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler

Davidson eds., 1992). See generally id. at 7-51, for a historical framework and comprehensive
background of both the Voting Rights Act and minority vote dilution.
22. See id. at 30.
23.
See Cox & Miles, supranote 20, at 1498 (citing City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S.
55, 62 (1980) (plurality opinion)); Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Amendments of Section 2 and
Minority Representation, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 21, at 66, 67.
24.
McDonald, supra note 23, at 67-69. See id. at 66-84, for additional discussion and analysis on the 1982 amendments to § 2.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006).
26. See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 16, 21, 27 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 193,
199, 205.
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cial standard created in Thornburg v. Gingles27 serve as the two-pronged
evaluation that courts currently use to determine vote dilution claims
pursuant to § 2.
B. Thornburg v. Gingles
Decided in 1986, Gingles was the first major voting rights decision
after Congress amended § 2, and remains the landmark case on vote dilution and the Voting Rights Act. 28 In Gingles, the Court held that certain
multimember districts in the North Carolina Legislature illegally diluted
African-American voting opportunities.2 9
Gingles established the doctrinal framework for vote dilution claims
in multimember districts. 30 To prevail on a § 2 claim, the minority petitioner must meet three doctrinal requirements: (1) they must demonstrate
that their minority group is large enough and compact enough to constitute a majority if they were placed in a single member district; (2) they
must demonstrate that the minority group is politically cohesive; and (3)
they must demonstrate that a white majority group votes together in
enough numbers to defeat the minority's preferred candidate.31 If those
requirements are met, the Court will then examine the totality of the circumstances to determine if a violation occurred. 32 Although the two-step
framework in Gingles initially applied only to multimember districts,
subsequent decisions concluded that33single-member districting schemes
could be challenged as vote dilution.
C. Voinovich v. Quilter 34
In Voinovich, the Court held that the petitioners failed the Gingles
test, and therefore could not establish a § 2 violation. 35 Voinovich involved influence dilution, where a minority group is not overwhelmed by
whites within a district, but "packed" into super-majorities in fewer districts to dilute their overall influence across the state. 36 Since the petitioners conceded that Ohio did not experience a significant amount of
racially polarized voting (where voters choose their candidates based on
race), the Court found that the claim against the Ohio apportionment
27.
478 U.S. 30, 46 (1986).
28.
Cox & Miles, supra note 20, at 1500.
29.
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 80. See BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION
AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 47-60 (1992), for further background and analysis of the
Court's decision in Gingles, and the implications of that decision.
30.
Cox & Miles, supranote 20, at 1501.
31.
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-52; see also GROFMAN Er AL., supra note 29, at 61-81 (discussing the three-pronged test).
32. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46.
33. E.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1241 (2009) (plurality opinion); Growe v.
Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40-41 (1993).
34. 507 U.S. 146 (1993).
35.
Id. at 158.
36. u at 149-51.
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board failed to meet the third Gingles requirement.37 The Court noted
that the Gingles requirements must be tailored to the nature of each
claim, and adjusted the Gingles framework accordingly. 38 The Court
determined the first requirement-that a minority group constitute a majority in a single district-would need alteration or removal
39 in influence
met.
are
requirements
other
two
the
where
dilution claims
D. Johnson v. De Grandy 4°
In Johnson v. De Grandy, the Court addressed proportionality in
vote dilution. The Court held that no violation of § 2 occurs when minority voters form effective voting majorities in a number of districts roughly proportional to their share of the voting age population. 4' The petitioners in De Grandy argued that the Florida House of Representatives' redistricting plan fragmented minorities into separate districts, which illegally diluted their voting power.42 The Court found that their claim satisfied
the Gingles requirements and determined, on the totality of the circumstances, that the Hispanic minority group constituted a majority in a number of districts proportional to their overall population percentage.4 3
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, reasoned that § 2 does not
bestow on majorities the right to total maximization of their voting power.44 In its discussion of crossover districts-where a minority group does
not constitute a majority of the population in a district but is sufficiently
large to form coalitions with majority members that "crossover" to elect
their chosen candidate-the Court noted that "minority voters are not
immune from the obligation to pull, haul, and trade to find common political ground. '45
E. Georgia v. Ashcroft4
In Ashcroft, the Court authorized state districting bodies to create
crossover districts to replace majority-minority districts under § 5 of the
Voting Rights Act.47 Although the violation in Ashcroft was based on a
§ 5 violation, which requires certain Southern states to pre-clear with a
federal court any redistricting that may reestablish racial discrimination,
the Court's discussion of § 2 and vote dilution in crossover districts is
37.
Id. at 158.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40.
512 U.S. 997 (1994).
Id.at 1000.
41.
42.
Id. at 1002.
Id. at 1014-15.
43.
Id.at 1016.
44.
45.
Id. at 1020.
539 U.S. 461 (2003).
46.
Id. at 480-82; Michael A. Carvin & Louis K. Fisher, "A Legislative Task": Why Four
47.
Types of Redistricting Challenges Are Not, or Should Not Be, Recognized by Courts, 4 ELECTION
L.J. 2, 20 (2005).

586
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particularly relevant to the analysis of Bartlett. In Ashcroft, the AfricanAmerican minority group, which consistently voted Democrat by a large
margin, supported the decision by the Democratic-controlled Georgia
State Legislature to "unpack" districts with large African-American majorities to create more crossover districts. 48 This unpacking would not
result in fewer majority-minority districts, but would lessen the relative
majority of African-Americans in order to increase their influence in
other districts. 49 By allowing crossover districts, the Court recognized
that minority groups could also participate equally in elections in districts
where they are not a majority of the population. 50 For claims brought
under the Voting Rights Act, the Court held that any inquiry of districting violations must examine the districting plan across the entire state,
not just selected districts, to determine whether a § 5 violation has occurred.5 '
52
F. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry ("LULAC")

In LULAC, the Court held that a redistricting plan does not violate §
2 if the minority group involved could not elect a candidate of its choice
without illegal vote dilution.53 Among the multiple allegations put forth
in LULAC, African-American petitioners claimed vote dilution in a district where they constituted twenty-five percent of the voting population,
but sixty-four percent of those voting in Democratic primaries. 54 The
Court found this percentage of voters would influence, but not control,
the proposed district. Consequently, 55
the Court held the petitioners did not
satisfy the first Ginglesrequirement.
The LULAC Court reasoned § 2 only provides minorities with the
opportunity to elect their preferred candidates, which they cannot do if
they merely exert minority influence in primary elections.56 Minority
groups would still need "crossover" support from non-minority voters to
actually elect the preferred candidate. 57 Recognizing the petitioner's situation as a § 2 violation, the court reasoned, "would unnecessarily infuse
race into virtually every redistricting, raising serious constitutional questions."58
The above cases demonstrate that parties claim § 2 violations in a
wide variety of electoral circumstances. Before 2009, however, the Court
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

539 U.S. at 470-71.
Id.
Carvin & Fisher, supranote 47, at 20.
539 U.S. at 479.
548 U.S. 399 (2006).
Id. at 445.
Id. at 443-44.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 445.
See id.
I at 446.
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had not decided whether a state must redistrict an area where the minority group could not constitute a majority of voters, but could elect their
preferred candidate with help of majority voters in a crossover district. In
Bartlett v. Strickland, the Court addressed this issue.5 9
II. BARTLETT V.

STRiCKLAND

A. Facts
In 1991, to meet the Voting Rights Act requirements, the North
Carolina General Assembly created District 18 by dividing portions of
four counties, including Pender County. 60 At the time, the new District
18 would have had an African-American voting majority. 61 The North
Carolina State Constitution, however, prohibited dividing whole counties
when drawing legislative districts.62 Consequently, the North Carolina
Supreme Court twice used the state's "Whole County Provision" to reject
the General Assembly's redistricting attempts to divide Pender County.63
When the Assembly attempted to reapportion the region a third time, the
proportion of voting age African-Americans in the potential district had
fallen below fifty percent, and the Assembly could not create a district
with a majority of African-American voters. 64 Specifically, thirty-five
percent of the voters in the new district would have been AfricanAmerican if Pender County was not split, but thirty-nine percent would
be African-American if the Assembly divided the county. The Assembly justified the split-and the violation of the state constitution-by
arguing a failure to split would have "diluted the minority group's voting
strength in violation of § 2. ' ' 66
B. ProceduralHistory
In 2004, Pender County and members of its Board of Commissioners filed suit against the Governor, the Director of the State Board of
Elections, and other state officials in North Carolina state court, claiming
that the Assembly violated the Whole County Provision by dividing
Pender County.67 The defendants answered by claiming § 2 required the
division plan.68 Unlike § 2 claims in the previous cases, where petitioners
from minority groups claimed a violation of the Voting Rights against a
districting body, in Bartlett the districting body raised a § 2 defense to its
59. Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1238 (2009) (plurality opinion).
60. Id. at 1239.
61.
Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.; see also N.C. CONST. art. I1, § 3; Stephenson v. Bartlett (Stephenson 1), 562 S.E.2d
377, 381-395 (N.C. 2002) (discussing the Whole County Provision).
64. Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1239 (plurality opinion).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1240.
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own districting action. 6 9 As a result, the Assembly had to prove that a
vote dilution violation would have occurred without the split county
plan.7 °
Although the African-American minority could not constitute a numerical majority in the newly proposed district, thereby failing to meet
the first Gingles requirement, the trial court concluded the minority voting bloc constituted a de facto majority because they would be able to
elect candidates of their choice with some support from white "crossover" voters. 7' The court then concluded that the African-Americans in the
district voted together with enough cohesiveness to meet the second Gingles requirement.72 The petitioners did not have to prove the third Gingles requirement because the respondents had already conceded that it
had been met.73 With the Gingles framework satisfied, the trial court held
that, under the totality of the circumstances, § 2 required a split of Pender
County.74
On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed and found
the state did not establish a § 2 violation. 75 The court based its reversal
on the first Gingles element and ordered the General Assembly to redraw
the boundaries and keep Pender County whole. 76 Because the AfricanAmerican group did not constitute a numerical majority under the new
boundaries of District 18, the court held that no vote dilution could have
had occurred.77

C. PluralityOpinion
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the first Gingles requirement can be satisfied in crossover districts where the minority group constitutes less than fifty percent of the
voting-age population in the proposed district.78 The plurality opinion,
written by Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, affirmed the North Carolina Supreme Court decision.79

69. Id.
70. Id.
71.
Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1243. The Court, in affirming the Supreme Court of North Carolina's holding,
elaborated on the first Gingles requirement-a numerical majority of minority voters-when it
stated, "[b]ut because [African-Americans] form only 39 percent of the voting-age population in
District 18, African-Americans standing alone have not better or worse opportunity to elect a candidate than does any other group of voters with the same relative voting strength."
77.
Id. at 1240.
78.
Id. at 1241.
79.
Id. at 1238, 1250.
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The Court reached two conclusions in holding that § 2 does not extend to crossover districts. 80 First, the Court held that § 2 only provides
minority groups equal participation in elections, not the right to form
coalitions with other crossover voters.8' The Court determined that, in
the absence of a majority-minority district, a minority group's ability to
elect a preferred candidate is not inferior to white voters' ability.82 The
establishment of equal opportunity for minority groups under § 2 does
not impose on districting bodies the duty to "give minority voters the
most potential, or83the best potential, to elect a candidate by attracting
crossover voters.,
Second, the Court rejected the petitioner's claim that § 2 should extend to crossover districts. The Court reasoned that the petitioner's proposed result would create an unmanageable standard and infuse race into
nearly every districting decision.84 If § 2 were read to mandate crossover
districts to correct vote dilution, courts would be forced to replace the
fairly efficient standard for determining if the minority group would constitute a majority of the voting age population with a complex and predictive determination involving voter-turnouts, levels of proportionality,
crossover likelihood, polling inquiries, and voter trends. 85 This new standard would apply to every redistricting jurisdiction nationwide, and
would force courts to base every districting decision, at least partially, on
racial classifications.86
Although the Court held that § 2 did not require states to protect
crossover districts, the plurality nonetheless acknowledged that states
were free to create crossover districts if the state did not violate other
state prohibitions.8 7 The plurality noted that crossover districts can foster
cooperation between majority and minority groups and reduce the impact
of racial polarization in elections.88 Justice Kennedy also recognized that
a districting body faced with defending a § 2 suit could point to crossover districting as evidence of attempts to provide minority groups with an
equal voting opportunity, and lack of cohesion in the white majority voting group.89
D. ConcurringOpinion
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, argued that the Voting
Rights Act does not authorize vote dilution claims in any circumstance,
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.

1243-49.
1243.
1244 (citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 49 n.15 (1986)).
1243.
1247.
1244-45.
1247.
1248.
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and that the Gingles framework was a "disastrous misadventure in judicial policymaking."' 9° The concurring Justices argued that the Act only
guarantees a right of access to the ballot, 91and that claims of racial gerrymandering are non-justiciable because there are no judicially discernible and manageable standards to decide such claims.92
E. Dissent
Justice Souter-joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyerdissented, and argued restricting § 2 claims to majority-minority districts
uses an arbitrary threshold to deny minorities in certain districts the opportunity to elect their chosen representatives. 93 In disputing the plurality's concerns over extending the role of race-based determinations in
electoral politics, Justice Souter argued that crossover districts foster
racial understanding and cooperation, and will actually serve to minimize
racial polarization. He also maintained that the plurality's workable
standard argument is inexact and does not justify ignoring a § 2 claim,
citing the already lengthy and racially-based analysis
that courts must
95
requirements.
Gingles
the
determine
to
undertake
Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Souter's dissent, and argued separately that Congress should clarify the debate regarding § 2's appropriate
coverage in light of the plurality's decision.96 In a separate dissent, Justice Breyer proposed extending § 2 claims to districts where the minority
population
and percentage of majority crossover equaled a two-to-one
97
ratio.
III. ANALYSIS

The plurality opinion in Bartlettproperly limits claims of vote dilution to majority-minority districts. By narrowly interpreting the first
Gingles requirement and not extending § 2 claims to crossover districts,
the Court rightly refused to extend the Voting Rights Act's mandate of
equal opportunity for minority voters into statutory permission for partisan preferences and minority spoils. Had the Court extended § 2 to
mandate the creation of crossover districts, three damaging consequences
would have resulted.
First, the Court would have created a new right for groups to form
winning coalitions that only benefit protected minorities, which was not
part of the Voting Rights Act's equal protection guarantee. Second, the
90.

Id. at 1250 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Holder v.

Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 893 (1994).

91.
92.
93.

Id. (citing Holder,512 U.S. at 893).
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 123 (1986).
Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1254 (Souter, J., dissenting).

94.

Id. at 1255.

95.
96.
97.

Id. at 1257.
Id. at 1260 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1261 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Court would have broadened political gerrymandering by replacing a
workable standard with a complex, racially-derived substitute. Third, the
Court would have reversed the current trend away from identity politics
and racial polarization by requiring racial inquiries in all districting questions and propagating a spoils system.
A. Expanding § 2 to CrossoverDistricts is Beyond the Scope of the Voting Rights Act
1. Equality or Opportunity?
The Voting Rights Act provides minority groups with a right to
That right can be defined as the equal opportunity to participate in
election voting; it is violated only if a member of a protected minority
class has "less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice." 99 Therefore, a § 2 violation has occurred only when a minority
group's opportunity, or ability, to elect their chosen candidate has been
denied or abridged by a redistricting plan.'0°
vote. a8

The first requirement in Gingles provides the necessary framework
to allow courts to determine if there was a violation of § 2. Requiring a
protected minority group to demonstrate a majority of voters in a new
district is essential because, if that group could not constitute a majority
in the new district, they do not possess the ability to elect their candidate.
Therefore, without an ability to elect a preferred candidate through majority voting, there is no right or opportunity that a districting body could
deny. 10 1 If a protected group is a proportional minority in a given district,
their failure to elect a preferred candidate would lie in their already insufficient demographics, not in discriminatory districting. In crossover districts, dilution of minority voting power cannot occur because the minority group does not have any power that can be diluted. As the Court
noted in Gingles, "Unless minority voters possess the potential to elect
representatives in the absence of the challenged structure or practice,
' 2
they cannot claim to have been injured by that structure or practice. 10
The dissent contends that the plurality's narrow interpretation of
Gingles is inconsistent with functionalist approaches in previous dilution
cases. 10 3 But this interpretation seems misleading. In Voinovich, the
Court stated the Gingles test "cannot be applied mechanically and without regard to the nature of the claim,"' °0' but in that case the vote dilution
98.
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006).
99.
Id.
100.
See id.
See Carvin & Fisher, supranote 47, at 17-18.
101.
102. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 n.17 (1986).
See Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S.Ct. 1231, 1255 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also
103.
Note, supranote 2, at 2608.
Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 158 (1993).
104.
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claims involved "packing," or reverse-dilution, of minorities into supermajorities. 0 5 In that situation, the Court would have correctly modified
the first Gingles requirement because the petitioners sought to disperse
their "super-majority" in a single district into sufficiently large numerical
minorities across multiple districts.1°6 Due to petitioners' unique circumstances-they sought to alleviate reverse-dilution through the creation of multiple new districts in which they would constitute a numerical
minority of voters-the first Gingles requirement, which requires a numerical majority, would have been fatal to their claim. 10 7 Accordingly,
the Supreme Court held that certain § 2 claims could necessitate modification or exclusion of the Gingles factors.1° 8 In Bartlett, however, no
such situation existed, and the Gingles framework did not require adjustment. Therefore, it would be illogical for the Court to discard the first
requirement by allowing crossover district claims.
2. A Right to Successful Coalitions?
Nowhere in the text of the Voting Rights Act is there a promise extending the right to form coalitions, crossover-voting factions, or other
advantageous political alliances to elect minority-preferred candidates.' °9
If a minority group cannot form a winning coalition, their ability to elect
a candidate has not been denied-no group has a right to a winning coalition." 0 A group's inability to form coalitions is based on failures of
persuasion and influence, not voter discrimination. Any special privilege
to force district arrangements to benefit minority-led coalitions would
grant minority groups special immunity to "pull, haul, and trade to find
common political ground,""' a result the Court specifically rejected in
De Grandy.
The Court's holding in Bartlettis consistent with previous cases on
this issue, 1 2 and granting minorities the right to form winning coalitions
would have presented significant problems. In De Grandy, Justice Souter
wrote that minority groups had the same advantages and disadvantages
with regard to forming voting coalitions." 3 Holding that § 2 did not define dilution as a failure to maximize a minority's political leverage, he

105. Id.
at 153.
106.
Id. at158 (holding that "[tihe first Gingles precondition, the requirement that the group be
sufficiently large to constitute a majority in a single district, would have to modified or eliminated
when analyzing the influence-dilution claim we assume, arguendo, to be actionable today .. .
[t]complaint isnot that
black voters have been deprived of the ability to constitute a majority, but of
the possibility of being a sufficiently large minority to elect their candidate of choice with the assistance of cross-over votes from the white majority").
107.
Id.
108. Id.
109. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
110. See Johnson v.De Grandy, 512 U.S.997, 1027 (1994).
lid.l at1020.
112. See Bartlett v.Strickland, 129 S.Ct. 1231, 1236 (2009) (plurality
opinion).
113. De Grandy, 512 U.S.at1017.
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concluded that "one is not entitled to suspect (much
less infer) dilution
'
from mere failure to guarantee a political feast. 14
In a § 2 crossover district claim, the group claiming denial or abridgement of voting rights is not a protected minority class, but a "coalition comprised of the protected class, plus an additional group of nonminority citizens, who happen to share the protected group's political preferences."11 5 Section 2 does not extend special treatment to voting coalitions, whether led by minority groups or majority ones. 1 6 An extension
of § 2 would give minority group-led coalitions preferential treatment
and violate the17 "basic principles of judicial neutrality and political evenhandedness."
B. Expanding § 2 EncouragesPoliticalGerrymanderingUnder the
Guise of Racial Equality
Legislative redistricting and the resulting challenges, while ostensibly motivated by racial inequalities, are commonly used for partisan political advantage. 118 The history of discrimination in election rights is
long and undeniable, and a large number of decisions are based on goodfaith efforts to remedy that past, but parties in vote dilution disputes are
often separated by political party as well as by race. 1 9 In Southern states,
political divides mirror racial ones, with African-Americans supporting
Democrats by a wide margin. 120
In Voinovich, Ashcroft, and LULAC, partisan goals took precedent
over racial equality concerns.1 21 In Voinovich, Republican members of
the state apportionment board approved the redistricting plan, while local
Democrats challenged it with support from party officials.1 22 In Ashcroft,
the Supreme Court found "[t]he goal of the Democratic leadershipblack and white" was to increase minority influence in Georgia to maintain political power. 123 And in LULAC, Democrats implemented the redistricting plan by "carefully construct[ing] democratic districts with incredibly convoluted lines and 2Pack[ing] heavily Republican suburban
areas into just a few districts."12 These cases demonstrate that both sides
114.

Id.

115.
Carvin & Fisher, supra note 47, at 18.
116.
Id.
117.
Id.
118.
See Note, supra note 2, at 2599.
119.
See Carvin & Fisher, supra note 47, at 18; Kareem U. Crayton, Beat 'Em or Join 'Em?
White Voters and Black Candidatesin Majority-Black Districts,58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 547, 554-55
(2008).
120.
See Crayton, supra note 119, at 554-55.
121.
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 411 (2006); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461,462 (2003); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 155 (1993).
122.
Voinovich, 507 U.S. at 149.
123.
Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 469.
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LULAC, 548 U.S. at 411 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Henderson v. Perry,
399 F. Supp. 2d 756, 767 n.47 (E.D. Tex. 2005)).
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of the aisle use racial gerrymandering to achieve their political objectives.
Gerrymandering encompasses "any redistricting practice which
maximizes the political advantage or votes of one group, and minimizes
the political advantage or votes of another." 125 Typically, evidence of
gerrymandering includes irregularities in the shape, size, number, and
uniformity of electoral districts.126 Although an irregularly shaped district
has traditionally been a trademark of gerrymandering, recent studies have
shown that it also occurs in regularly shaped districts whose boundaries
127
are based on political divisions and traditional geographic barriers.
Gerrymandering in American politics is both old and persistent. Patrick Henry is credited as the first gerrymanderer128 in his attempt to
hinder James Madison's election to Congress. As former Congressman
and political scientist Robert Luce said, "gerrymandering has become so
general and familiar a procedure
that it may fairly be called a characteris' 29
tic of American politics."
In certain instances Democrats deplore redistricting as political gerrymandering, and Republicans defend it. In others, Republicans cry foul,
while Democrats support it. Redistricting plans are either a deplorable
political tool or a moral and legal imperative, depending on who stands
to benefit. Expanding § 2 claims to include the mandatory creation of
crossover districts would only increase this political manipulation and
allow partisan political interests to further commandeer voting rights
legislation.
Allowing crossover claims would expose legislative districts across
the country to further gerrymandering and racially-based determinations. 130 If minorities were not required to constitute a numerical majority-or form a crossover coalition through political persuasion-then § 2
131
could be used to challenge virtually any redistricting plan with ease.
The number of potential crossover claims is staggering when one considers that "[a]ny district with a cognizable group of minorities which elects
a white Democrat is, ipso facto, a 'coalition' district,"' 132 meaning a minority group had formed a coalition with whites to elect the candidate.
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VOTE DILUTION, supra note 9, at 85, 85.

126.

Id. at 86-87.

127.

ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND

POLmTcs 460-62 (1968).
128.

Parker, supranote 125, at 85.
ROBERT LucE, LEGISLATIVE PRINCIPLES: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF LAWMAKING BY
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 398 (2006).
130.
See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1244 (2009) (plurality opinion).
131.
Note, supra note 2, at 2603.
132.
Carvin & Fisher, supranote 47, at 24.

129.

2010]

BARTLETT V. STRICKLAND

The Bartlett dissent's assertion that expanding § 2 to crossover dis1 33
tricts would only conserve an "uncertain amount of judicial resources"
seems implausible. If the first Gingles principle acted as a flexible guideline, rather than a required precondition, courts would have to assess the
validity of the other two Gingles factors and then engage in a totality-ofthe-circumstances examination regarding crossover voters, racial voting
bloc cohesion, and numerous other factors in non-majority districts. Even
if Justice Souter is correct in stating that courts already do this under
current § 2 standards, there is enormous potential for an increase in cognizable claims based on crossover districts.
The relative importance of judicial efficiency, workability, and consistency against allowing a new type of § 2 claim should be weighed
carefully. On one hand, if the new standard results in an unmanageable
number of cases, petitioners who have faced legitimate voting rights violations will have a smaller chance of receiving relief, and parties seeking political windfall may flood the courts. On the other hand, expanding
§ 2 claims may lead to the creation of new crossover districts and foster
greater political cooperation between minorities and whites. While there
is potential for progress by expanding § 2, the likely strains on the judicial system, in addition to problems of preferential treatment for minority
coalitions and political gerrymandering, outweigh the dissent's expansive
goal.
C. Away from Identity Politics: § 2 Should Not be Expanded to Include
CrossoverDistricts
The election of President Obama shows that the role of race in
American politics is changing. As courts continue to address racial redistricting and voter dilution claims in this new political landscape, they
must balance the need to remedy past racial discrimination in voting
rights with the current trend away from identity politics and towards a
more race-neutral generation of voters. As Justice O'Connor noted in
Ashcroft, "[t]he purpose of the Voting Rights Act is to . . 34. foster our
transformation to a society that is no longer fixated on race."'
There are indications, in addition to President Obama's election,
that racial polarization is abating in American electoral politics. 35 African-Americans and whites might still have largely different opinions
about proper government priorities, pressing issues, and policy viewpoints, 136 but racial crossover voting is increasing and fewer Americans
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Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1257 (Souter, J., dissenting).
134.
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461,490 (2003).
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are choosing candidates based on their skin color. 137 Although many
scholars have tried to determine the state of racially polarized voting to
predict future trends, they have reached different results. 138 Some scholars base their findings on complex statistical analysis of electoral districts in the South. 139 Others simply accept that racially polarized voting
is either here to stay or near its end.1 40 This disparity in results is due to
the extremely large and volatile number of variables involved with analyzing electoral results, including: incumbency, registration figures, voter
turnout, partisanship, national elections, and other political concerns.
There are, nonetheless, indications that voters' electoral choices are
increasingly based less on the race of the candidates.14 One empirical
study analyzing election results in 2,400 different American cities at two
separate periods found that African-American candidates do equally well
in at-large districts as in African-American majority districts, 142 and that
"the waning efficacy of district elections has been due to a general reduction in the racial polarization of voters."'143 Another study examined election returns in three Southern states to determine whether Africant44
Americans needed majority districts to elect candidates of their choice.
In re-drawn districts where the majority of voters shifted from AfricanAmericans to whites, no Georgia legislator lost to a white candidate in
1996 or 1998.145 The overall findings of the study show that, although
racial polarization is still evident in the South, white voter crossover has
increased, and African-American candidates are attracting white voters
in increasing numbers.' 46 Indeed, studies show that white Democratic
voters in the South vote for white and African-American Democratic
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candidates at nearly the same rate. 147 This research indicates that racial
polarization continues to lose footing in our electoral process. 148
If the Court extended § 2 to include crossover districts, it would unnecessarily involve race in election districting 149 even as elections become increasingly race-neutral. District planning committees would have
to consider the racial proportionality of each new district to avoid liability from the influx of new § 2 claims brought by groups alleging denial of
their right to form advantageous political coalitions. Similarly, courts
would be forced to consider the proportions of minority groups, their
voting cohesion, turnout percentages, and ability to attract white voters in
every redistricting violation claim. 5 ° Rather than deemphasizing racial
factors in election law cases, extending § 2 would require courts to make
racially-based assumptions in nearly every decision.
The Bartlett dissent's argument that recognizing crossover districts
would encourage states to create them-and in turn precipitate collaboration between minorities and whites--overlooks a major problem: granting the valuable right to form winning coalitions to only protected minorities would create a racial spoils system, and generate controversy and
resentment among voters outside the coalition. A system that required
districting bodies to create majority-minority districts, and mandated the
maximization of minority group power to influence elections, would
further entrench racial separation in the electoral process and inhibit
crossover collaboration. Whereas the plurality allows districting bodies
to create crossover districts 151 to encourage inter-racial coalitions, the
dissent forces their creation without mention or consideration of the negative impact on inter-racial relations. This oversight would lead to greater racial polarization and away from
the color-blind goals that Justice
52
O'Connor mentioned in Ashcroft.1
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Bartlett benefits minority and
white voters alike. By refusing to extend § 2 to crossover districts, the
Court correctly limited the influence that race-and its stereotypes, connotations, and assumptions-will have in the American electoral process.
Racial stereotypes continue to wane in the political sphere, and new generations, unencumbered by the prejudices of previous ones, are exercising their right to vote with an increasingly post-racial outlook. U.S. Con147. Id. at 1240-41 ("In general, we find that these [black congressional] incumbents attract
about one-third of the white general election vote, a result that is in line with levels of white support
for white Democratic candidates for other federal offices in the South.").
148.
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gressman John Lewis-a leader of the Civil Rights Movement and one
of the longest serving African-American members of Congress-said
this of minority districting: "We have changed. We've come a great disSouth, I think people
tance. It's not just in Georgia, but in the American
53
are preparing to lay down the burden of race."'
In this climate, the Court has attempted to keep racial polarization
and identity politics off the ballot. While significant obstacles remain to
achieve complete racial equality in our society and remedy previous discrimination, expanding a spoils system that mixes perverse political manipulation and gerrymandering with racial sensitivities is not the solution.
In Bartlett, the Court refused to extend a nonexistent right to form
profitable political coalitions, maintained an effective standard for addressing vote dilution claims, and advanced the notion, to borrow from
Chief Justice Roberts, that the most effective way to prevent discrimination on the basis of race is to stop propagating laws that discriminate on
the basis of race. 154
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